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Abstract
In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility — agents will
spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable constraints,
giving only second-order consideration to the trade-off between value and price. While this
perspective is commonly captured in consumer choice theory, market equilibrium theory, and
other fields, it is markedly absent from the mechanism design literature — agents strategizing
in a mechanism with money are almost always assumed to incorporate money as an objective
through quasilinear valuations. We study a simple model of value maximizers that captures
online advertisers and other agents who may view money solely as a constraint, and study
general questions of mechanism design for such agents. We show that the feasible and optimal
points faced by a mechanism designer change dramatically from the quasilinear realm and lay
a foundation for a broader study of value maximization in mechanism design. Along the way,
we offer new insight into the generalized second price (GSP) auction commonly used in Internet
advertising. Through the lens of value maximization, GSP metamorphosizes into a truthful
auction, sound in its principles and elegant in its simplicity.
1 Introduction
Quasilinear utilities epitomize lex parsimoniae: they are ubiquitous in Economics because they are
the simplest objective that trades value for money. However, they presuppose that money is in
fact a goal, while many practically significant categories of strategic agents do not consider money
to be a first-order objective. Rather, they want value, and money is simply treated as a spending
constraint.
Case in point: Amazon.com. Over the past 10 years, the e-commerce giant’s profit margins
have averaged a mere 2.21%, much closer to brick-and-mortar stores like Best Buy (1.77%) and
Barnes & Noble (−0.18%) than e-commerce and Internet companies like eBay (17.18%) and Google
(24.16%) (profit margin data from ycharts.com). Why? Amazon’s worth is not maximized by
making a quick buck in the moment, but by growing to become the 10,000lb gorilla of e-commerce.
Reinvesting $1 will pay out many times over in long-term value, so Amazon’s reinvestment is simply
limited by incoming revenue. The market has a heuristic for this — strong revenue (i.e., value)
indicates a company’s potential for growth, so we can say maximizing Amazon’s revenue (subject
to profitability) is its goal, not profit (quasilinear utility).
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Indeed, many fundamental models in microeconomic theory start by assuming money has no
utility. It is standard in consumer choice theory to give each buyer a budget that will be entirely
consumed. Similarly, the theory of general equilibrium introduces money as a lubricating tool that
almost disappears in equilibrium — agents sell their goods and buy other goods, consuming their
entire income. In these settings, agents are modeled simply by their preference over goods with no
benefit from leftover money.
Yet, in mechanism design it is unsatisfactory to assume money is always spent. Auctions and
other mechanisms with money exploit quasilinear agents’ price-sensitivity to ensure, e.g., that the
winner is the bidder with the highest value; sacrificing price-sensitivity renders much of the mech-
anism design literature meaningless. This leaves us with a hole: what is the lex parsimoniae model
for agents who, while sensitive to price, still see money as mainly a constraint? Our answer lies in
a remarkably simple value-maximizing model:
Definition (Informal). A simple value maximizer strategizes to maximize the value vi he obtains
while keeping payment pi ≤ vi; among outcomes with equal value, a lower price is strictly preferred.
This definition captures the idea that an agent maximizes her perceived value with only a
second-order consideration for saving money.
An important application of the value maximizing model is when vi directly measures the max-
imum the agent is able to pay, e.g., due to budget or Return on Investment (ROI) constraints. As
we will discuss, advertisers frequently manifest such behavior — consider an online advertiser who
wants to maintain a fixed profit margin. If this advertiser has an average net profit of $4 from each
consumer who clicks on its ad and wants to maintain a fixed profit margin of 50%, the advertiser
would be wiling to pay $2 per click, i.e., vi = 2 for one click, vi = 4 for two clicks, and so on.
Budgets also highlight an important extension to the simple value maximizer model: agents
may have a strict preference over outcomes even though willingness to pay is the same. This is very
naturally motivated when willingness to pay is determined by ability to pay (i.e., budget), which is
frequently a fixed amount of cash on hand that provides a uniform binding constraint regardless of
what outcome results. This motivates our full definition of a value maximizer:
Definition (Informal). A value maximizer has a preference over outcomes and a maximum willing-
ness to pay for each outcome. It strategizes to achieve the most preferred outcome without incurring
a price above what it is willing to pay.
For this paper we restrict attention to a refinement of the model in which the willingness-to-pay
ordering does not clash with the preference ordering.
This strictly generalizes the simple value maximizer. However, in the most complex settings, the
models nearly converge again — when an agent’s willingness to pay is distinct for every outcome,
the model again coincides with a simple value maximizer. Thus, we will largely focus on simple
value maximizers.
1.1 Preferences Over Extreme Bundles
On face, agents who are value maximizers would be expected to exhibit extreme, arguably unnatural
behavior. Note that a value maximizer would choose an outcome with value $1,000 over an outcome
with value $999, even if the former cost $999 and the latter were free. However, this inherent lexi-
cographic behavior should not precipitate wholesale rejection of the model. When outcome values
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are sufficiently differentiated, we will show that the preferences revealed by an agent who interacts
with an auction will be insufficient to differentiate between a strict value maximizer (intuitively
implausible) and an agent with complex preferences that limit the cost of marginal gains in extreme
cases (quite plausible). Moreover, we will show that is not a hollow theoretical excuse for down-
playing extreme behavior — in a standard auction model from Internet advertising, wide classes of
agent preferences would be indistinguishable from value maximizing preferences in an auction that
is truthful for value maximizers. Thus, truthful mechanisms for value maximizers are important
even though the preference model, in its simplicity, may be unrealistic in some extreme theoretical
scenarios.
1.2 Motivating settings
Value maximizing behavior can be seen across a wide variety of settings; we describe some here.
1.2.1 Internet advertisers
Internet advertisers are quintessential value maximizers. They can generally be categorized as
either brand or performance, both of which are well-captured by the simple value maximizer model,
optimizing value given different kinds of spending constraints.
Preferences of Brand Advertisers Brand advertisers aim for long-term growth and awareness.
They come to a marketplace with explicit objectives, and typically have a mandate to meet a specific
business goal—showing impressions to an audience, generating clicks, or maximizing revenue—
driven by long-term considerations instead of immediate profit. Thus cost, while important, merely
enters their preferences as a constraint; brand advertisers will have a budget and limits on what they
are willing to pay on average for an impression/click/conversion, but otherwise directly optimize
for their mandate.
Preferences of Performance Advertisers Performance advertisers, on the other hand, opti-
mize the immediate tradeoff between value—measured as sales, sign-ups, or other so-called con-
versions generated directly from their ads—and cost. Return on investment (ROI) has been the
standard metric for measuring this tradeoff across all types of advertising for decades. ROI measures
the ratio of the profit obtained (“return”) to the cost or price paid (“investment”), i.e., the density
of profit in cost:
ROI =
Value-Price
Price
=
Profit
Price
Being a density metric, unconstrained maximization of ROI is not sensible, mainly because un-
constrained maximization of ROI would likely cause an advertiser to buy only the single cheapest
impression or click available; instead, advertisers come with an ROI constraint and optimize (e.g.,
maximize revenue and/or clicks).
For example, the following story plays out regularly in Yahoo’s ad marketplaces:
1. Advertiser X designates a small budget for testing a Yahoo advertising product.
2. Advertiser X measures ROI — if X is happy with its ROI, it increases its budget hoping to
maintain the same ROI; if it is unhappy, it withdraws.
This behavior is also reflected in the standard industry tools: Google’s AdWords campaign
management tool buys as much advertising as possible while maintaining a target average cost-
per-click (CPC) and budget (an average CPC constraint corresponds to an ROI constraint, while
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a marginal CPC constraint would be appropriate for profit maximization). Yahoo’s display ad
products also offer options with “CPC goals” and “CPA goals” that buy impressions while aiming
to achieve a target average cost-per-click or cost-per-conversion, respectively.
Performance advertisers’ ROI-centric behavior does not follow the standard quasilinear intuition.
One way to resolve this conflict is to conclude that the intuition is wrong, perhaps since companies
often care about revenue and margins as much as profits. Another resolution is to conclude that
ROI is a deeply-ingrained heuristic for maximizing the effectiveness of a fixed resource, either
managing an advertising budget [Borgs et al., 2007, Kitts and Leblanc, 2004, Szymanski and Lee,
2006, Zhou et al., 2008, Auerbach et al., 2008] among auctions or between platforms (deciding how
to bid between Yahoo and Google), or even managing resources within the advertiser’s organization
(allocating a budget between marketing and engineering). But regardless, performance advertisers
behavior is rarely profit-maximizing.
1.2.2 Budgets as Targets
For many agents, the budget represents not simply an upper bound but also a target. For them,
budgets are the primary lever used to control their spending, in sharp contrast with auction theory,
where it is typically assumed that the most significant strategic parameter is the bid. Indeed, in
Internet advertising, many advertisers do not come with a bid but instead come with only a budget.
Intermediary algorithms then manage the advertiser’s bid to spend the budget fully. Such agents
want the platform to maximize value subject to the specified budget, otherwise this tuning process
is nonsensical.
More broadly, in large organizations, “budget” is typically a limited resource that must be
carefully provisioned among the many groups that need it. As a result, each group only gets what it
needs, and it is expected that budgets will bind. (This leads to a common and perverse phenomenon
wherein groups that underspend get a smaller budget during the next budgeting cycle.) Again, such
groups are incentivized to spend as much as they can within business constraints.
1.2.3 Agency
Any agent working on behalf of a principal will often be asked to and incentivized to maximize
value. For example, advertising agencies are commonly paid by commission. Consequently, an
agency’s utility is maximized by spending as much of the client’s money as possible without violating
constraints set forth by the client.
A more mundane example is an employee ordering coffee for a meeting. The meeting’s attendees
will focus on the quality of the coffee with little regard for its cost, if they even know it. As a
result, the employee ordering coffee—whose performance will be evaluated first on the quality of
the coffee—will optimize by getting the best coffee available within an implicit or explicit budget.
The general problem is due to the nature of agency — enlisting an agent on one’s behalf typically
requires fixing a budget and other constraints. Once these constraints are set forth, the agent is
primarily evaluated on maximizing value.
1.2.4 Companies
Almost paradoxically, companies commonly exhibit value-maximizing behavior despite the fact that
their raison d’être is ostensibly to make profit. One explanation is that while profit captures short-
term performance, the long-term prospects of a business are often divined from its revenue. A
company that maximizes revenue subject to maintaining profitability (revenue exceeds cost) is a
textbook example of a simple value maximizer.
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While using revenue as a bellwether for long-term performance is a heuristic, it is plausibly
grounded when long-term value from investment far exceeds immediate payoffs. Quasilinear utili-
ties assume free and unlimited borrowing, which is unrealistic in practice. Rather, companies are
generally expected to remain instantaneously profitable, and so their present investment in long-
term value is capped by their immediate profits. For example, the long-term value of a new customer
can easily be an order of magnitude higher than the profit attributed to said customer in its first
quarter or year. As long as a company’s long term value exceeds what it is able to pay (either con-
strained by revenue or by practical limits on borrowing against future profits), its optimal strategy
is to bring in as many customers as possible.
Amazon exemplifies how a focus on revenue optimizes for long-term value as noted earlier.
Yahoo’s recent history (prior to being acquired) is another example: investors’ headline goal and
demand was revenue growth as an indicator that the company had long-term value.
1.2.5 Consumers
For the consumer, value-maximizing behavior can be understood as comparing the price of an
item to an intrinsic value benchmark rather than considering the utility of leftover money. For
example, one author commonly employs this strategy to buy strawberries. He buys up to 4 pounds
of strawberries each week depending on price according to a value maximizing strategy — roughly,
if he can get 3 pounds for $8 or less, he buys 3 pounds; if 3 pounds is too expensive, he will buy 2
pounds if the price is at most $6; finally, if he can’t buy more, he buys 1 pound as long as the price
is at most $5. In particular, the author’s heuristic behavior is based on (learned) price thresholds
for each quantity; it is not based on the difference between value and price, as a quasilinear model
would require.
Neither is value maximizing behavior restricted to little purchases. Consider housing purchases.
A house buyer typically starts with limits on what he is willing or able to pay, then finds the best
house that satisfies these constraints. For example, a buyer might have a budget of $400,000 for the
perfect house, but a limit of $300,000 if the house only has 3 bedrooms. Subject to these constraints,
the buyer will find the house on the market with the highest value.
1.3 Our Results
We address fundamental mechanism design questions for value maximizers. First, what are truthful
mechanisms? For the single-parameter setting, we provide a characterization (Section 3). We then
use this characterization to derive the revenue-optimal mechanism for the simple setting of selling
k identical items to a single buyer. We show that the revenue-optimal ex-post truthful mechanism
heavily exploits second-degree price discrimination by limiting the number of goods sold, in sharp
contrast to Myerson’s optimal mechanism for quasilinear buyers that only requires a reserve price
and therefore sells all k items or nothing. In Sections 5 and 6, we then use our characterization of
truthful mechanisms to explain the centrality of the GSP mechanism for advertising auctions. We
demonstrate that GSP is the truthful mechanism for ad auctions with value maximizers.
In Section 7, we study mechanisms when values over outcomes are fully general, showing that
any mechanism from a family of transformed greedy mechanisms is always truthful even for unre-
stricted valuation structures. This family is analogous to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction
and affine maximizers in quasilinear settings. Interestingly, while affine maximizers in quasilinear
settings are limited to scaling bidders’ values, our greedy mechanisms are truthful for an arbitrary
monotone transformation of bidders’ values. Unfortunately but unsurprisingly, while these mech-
anisms are powerful because of their generality, since they are greedy we show that they can only
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guarantee a Θ(n)-approximation to the optimal sum of agents’ values.
1.4 Related Work
The idea that agents maximize value is common. For example, the traditional studies of consumer
choice and market equilibria begin with agents who pick the most-preferred bundle they can afford
based on their endowment [Mas-Collel et al., 1995].
In the context of mechanism design, a limited literature studies non-quasilinear bidders. Con-
current work by Fadaei and Bichler [2016] introduces a similar model and discusses a plethora of
similar and interesting motivating examples, then studies revenue maximization. Our model differs
notably because we say bidders prefer lower prices when value is held constant, while Fadaei and
Bichler imply bidders strictly prefer to spend their money. This difference fundamentally changes
the mechanism design problem, since without a weak preference for retaining money, Fadaei and
Bichler would, e.g., prescribe a first price auction when selling a single indivisible item while our
model would require a second price auction.
In the context of advertising auctions, Aggarwal et al. [2009] design sponsored search (slot)
auctions for advertisers whose preferences add constraints on top of a quasilinear utility. While their
general models are technically incomparable to ours, they cover our value maximizers in the special
case of sponsored search. Alaei et al. [2011] show how Walrasian equilibria in non-quasilinear unit-
demand settings can be leveraged to build ad auctions where estimation errors break quasilinearity.
A few papers study general truthful mechanisms for non-quasilinear preferences [Adachi, 2013,
Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015]. These papers develop axiomatic characterizations of a VCG-analog
for multi-unit and unit-demand settings.
2 Model and Preliminaries
A mechanism M picks an outcome o ∈ O and prices pi ∈ ℜ for each agent i ∈ [n]. Each agent has
a total preference order oi over O and a willingness-to-pay vi : O → ℜ for each outcome.
Together, oi and vi define a total preference order 
(o,p)
i over outcome-payment pairs (o, p) as
follows:
Definition 2.1. A value maximizer prefers bundles (o, p) according to oi as long as p ≤ vi(o), with
ties broken in favor of a lower price. When p > vi(o) a value maximizer prefers a lower price, with
ties broken in favor of oi .
We will largely focus on simple value maximizers, whose preferences are entirely defined by vi,
i.e., with o1 oi o2 if and only if vi(o1) ≥ vi(o2).
Definition 2.2. A simple value maximizer prefers bundles (o, p) with higher vi(o) as long as p ≤
vi(o), with ties broken in favor of a lower price. When p > vi(o) a lower price is preferred, with
ties broken in favor of a higher value. Formally, for any two outcome-payment pairs (o1, p1) and
(o2, p2), (o1, p1) ≻
(o,p)
i (o2, p2) if and only if any of the following hold:
• vi(o1) ≥ p1 ∧ vi(o1) > vi(o2)
• vi(o1) ≥ p1 ∧ p1 < p2 ∧ vi(o1) = vi(o2)
• vi(o2) < p2 ∧ p1 < p2
• vi(o2) < p2 ∧ p1 = p2 ∧ vi(o1) > vi(o2)
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For comparison, a quasilinear bidder always prefers the bundle that maximizes the difference
between value and price.
Definition 2.3. A budgeted value maximizer has a preference ordering o1 oi o2 over outcomes but
the same willingness to pay vi(o) = B for all of them.
Definition 2.4. A bidder with quasilinear preferences prefers bundles with higher vi(o) − p, i.e.,
vi(o1)− p1 ≥ vi(o2)− p2 ⇔ (o1, p1) 
(o,p)
i (o2, p2).
Mechanisms and Truthfulness. A direct revelation mechanism M takes reports of bidders’
preferences as input. We will work with simple value maximizers, whose preferences are entirely
encoded in vi. Given reported values, also known as bids and denoted by b, a mechanism chooses
an outcome f(b) and payments pi(b). We will often suppress f(·) when it is clear from context,
e.g., writing vi(b) instead of vi(f(b)). A mechanism is truthful if reporting a bidder’s true private
information (e.g., bidding bi = vi for simple value maximizers) is a dominant strategy:
Definition 2.5. A mechanism M = (x,p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if, for
any i and bids b−i, we have
(f(b−i, vi), pi(b−i, vi)) i (f(b−i, bi), pi(b−i, bi))
for all value functions vi and deviations bi.
In this paper, we will have trouble in continuous bid spaces when truthful bidding would induce
a tie; to solve this we use a slight weakening of DSIC that allows arbitrary behavior on a set of bids
that “never occur”:
Definition 2.6. A mechanism M = (x,p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible almost every-
where (DSIC-AE) if, for any i and bids b−i, we have
(f(b−i, vi), pi(b−i, vi)) i (f(b−i, bi), pi(b−i, bi))
for all value functions vi and deviations bi, except a set of vi with measure zero according to the
Lebesgue measure over vi (unless specified otherwise).
We loosely use the term “truthful” to describe either DSIC or DSIC-AE.
Remark 2.7. Note that DSIC is the same as DSIC-AE for a finite bid space. Our DSIC-AE
mechanisms will be DSIC when applied to a well-ordered bid space.
3 Characterizing Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Domains
To begin, we study truthful mechanisms whose private information can be represented by a sin-
gle parameter, specifically where the valuation function can be factored as vi(o) = vi · xi(o). In
quasilinear settings it is known that any monotone allocation rule can be made incentive compat-
ible [Myerson, 1981, Archer and Tardos, 2001] when xi(o) is public information and vi is private.
Two natural single-parameter models come to mind when studying value maximizers: simple value
maximizers instantiate our canonical model, preferring higher-value outcomes as long as the price
does not exceed the value; and budgeted value maximizers who prefer higher-valued outcomes as
long as the payment does not exceed the budget. In both cases, we will see that truthful mechanisms
have very simple prices: the price is the minimum value required to maintain the same allocation
x.
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Simple Value Maximizers
Theorem 3.1. For simple value maximizers in a single parameter domain, a mechanism is truthful
(DSIC-AE) if and only if the allocation is monotone and the price is the minimum value required
to get the same allocation:
• (monotonicity) [xi(z, v−i) > xi(v)]⇔ [z > vi] almost everywhere
• (pricing) pi(v) = infz|xi(z,v−i)=xi(v) zxi(v)
Corollary 3.2. For any monotone xi, the mechanism that charges pi(v) = infz|xi(z,v−i)=xi(v) zxi(v)
is DSIC-AE.
This corollary follows because the inf only differs from the min where x is discontinuous, and
a monotone function is continuous almost everywhere (discontinuities are countable and therefore
have measure zero).
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Fix other bidders’ values v−i and drop them for clarity.
Necessity. Fix a type vi and define
Z< = {z|xi(z) < xi(vi)} and Z
= = {z|xi(z) = xi(vi)}
to be the types that get a strictly smaller allocation than vi and an equal allocation respectively. A
value maximizer with single parameter type vi will choose a bid bi that maximizes xi(bi) subject to
pi(bi) ≤ vi. Thus, for any vi, pi(vi) must be high enough that bidders who get a smaller allocation
do not want to lie, i.e.
pi(vi) ≥ pi , supZ
< .
Similarly, all types who exactly get xi(vi) must pay the same price, and it must be that any bidder
who gets xi(vi) must be willing to pay for it, so
pi(vi) ≤ pi = inf Z
= .
Since supZ< ≥ inf Z=, it must be that p
i
≥ pi, and therefore to satisfy pi ≤ pi(vi) ≤ pi a mechanism
will be truthful if and only if p
i
= pi = pi(vi) — this happens if and only if x is nondecreasing and
is the price defined in the theorem.
Sufficiency. Note that for DSIC-AE we only need to prove sufficiency almost everywhere. We
must consider three deviations: (1) a bidder underbids for a smaller allocation, (2) a bidder deviates
for the same allocation at a lower price, and (3) a bidder overbids for a larger allocation. Note that
deviation (1) will not happen because a value maximizer will always want the larger allocation
(since pi(vi) ≤ vi by definition of pi), and that (2) cannot happen because all types who get the
same allocation pay the same price.
It remains to show that bidders almost never have an incentive to raise a bid (3). Deviation
(3) will only be beneficial if there exists a type z > vi such that xi(z) > xi(vi) but pi(z) < vi. By
definition of pi, there exists a type bi(z) ≥ vi such that
pi(z) = bi(z) .
As long as bi(z) > vi this deviation cannot be beneficial. Unfortunately, when bi(z) = vi then
deviation (3) will be beneficial; however, this can only happen at a discontinuity in x. Since
x is monotone, discontinuities can only happen rarely (the set of discontinuities is countable and
therefore has measure 0) and we get truthfulness in our almost-everywhere sense (DSIC-AE).
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Budgeted Value Maximizers
Budgets are another natural setting where value maximizers have a single piece of private in-
formation to reveal. It is often the case that an agent’s preference ordering oi over outcomes is
public knowledge (say, advertisers obviously prefer to be ranked higher on the page) and an agent
has a fixed budget irrespective of the outcome. In this case, the only information that a bidder
must reveal is the maximum amount it is willing to pay, vi. We find that a nearly identical result
holds in this setting:
Theorem 3.3. For value maximizers with a single budget vi = Bi, a mechanism on a countable
outcome space is truthful (DSIC-AE) if and only if it is monotone and the price is the minimum
budget required to get the same allocation:
• (monotonicity) for any v−i, f(z, v−i) ≻oi f(v) if and only if z > vi almost everywhere over vi
• (pricing) pi(v) = inf{z|f(z, v−i) = f(v)}
We also observe an analogous corollary:
Corollary 3.4. For any monotone xi, the mechanism that charges pi(v) = inf{z|f(z, v−i) = f(v)}
is DSIC-AE.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 3.1 and is omitted.
4 Maximizing Revenue from a Single Agent
In this section, we use the the characterization just derived for a single-dimensional simple value
maximizer to study mechanisms that maximize revenue. We suppose the type is a value drawn from
a distribution F and maximize expected revenue among deterministic, DSIC mechanisms for selling
k identical items. Any such mechanism maps the agent’s value v to a deterministic allocation
x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}. The agent gets value for allocation v · x(v) (i.e., its value is additive across
identical items), and is charged a deterministic payment p(v). (Note that the same problem for
randomized mechanisms is ill-posed without a model for how value maximizers evaluate lotteries
over allocations.)
We start with an example where revenue-optimality entails second-degree price discrimination,
i.e., the agent is offered the option to buy any number of items from 0 to k, and a positive measure of
values will take each of the k+1 different offers. This stands in contrast to the optimal mechanism
for a quasilinear agent, in which the menu consists of 0 items and k items, with nothing in between.
We then generalize and provide a revenue-optimal single-agent mechanism that can be computed
in polynomial time via dynamic programming, and show that across all possible inputs, the price
discrimination it applies is the necessary rule rather than the exception.
4.1 Example: Two Items, Uniform Agent
Consider selling a supply of two items to an agent with value v drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. If the
agent was quasilinear, the results of Myerson [1981] imply that the optimal mechanism would be to
sell the bundle of both items at price 1 if v ≥ 1/2, and to sell nothing otherwise. We will show that
if the agent is a simple value maximizer, the optimal mechanism will sell a single item to a positive
measure of values, in addition to selling both items and no items at all with positive probability.
To derive the optimal mechanism, we use the characterization in Section 3 for single-parameter
agents. Namely, we optimize over all deterministic, monotone allocation rules, which are given by
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two values: the value t1 where the allocation steps up from 0 to 1, and the value t2 where the
allocation steps up from 1 to 2. Individual rationality implies that the truthful payments for an
agent with value v < t1 is 0. Corollary 3.2 implies that the truthful payment for an agent with
value v ∈ [t1, t2) is t1, and for an agent with value v ≥ t2 is 2 · t2. The revenue of our mechanism
is therefore t1(t2 − t1) + 2t2(1 − t2), where the first term is revenue from the event that the agent
receives a single item, and the second term from the event where the agent receives two items. All
that remains is to optimize this function over 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ 1, which yields an optimal solution of
t1 = 2/7, and t2 = 4/7. Hence, the optimal mechanism allocates exactly one item with probability
2/7. This is second-degree price discrimination.
4.2 Optimal Single-Agent Mechanisms
We now give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal mechanism for selling k items to
a simple value maximizing agent. Note that for a deterministic mechanism, Theorem 3.1 implies
that we need only choose the thresholds tj at which the allocation level increases from j − 1 to j
for all j from 1 to k. For simplicity of exposition, we assume the value distribution F is finitely
supported on a set v1, . . . , vn, with probability mass function given by f(·). Label this set such
that v1 < v2 < . . . < vn. Extending our algorithm to continuous distributions is straightforward for
most standard models for distributional access.
Corollary 3.2 implies that the expected revenue of a mechanism with thresholds t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤
tk is given by:
k∑
ℓ=1
ℓ · tℓ(F (tℓ+1)− F (tℓ)), (1)
where F (vi) is given by
∑i−1
j=1 f(vi) = Pr[v < vi], and where F (vn+1) is defined to be 1.
Define OPT(i, j) to be the maximum attainable revenue from only selling to values at least vj ,
and only selling i or more items in the event of a sale. Then the value of (1) with the optimal
thresholds is equal to OPT(1, 1). Moreover, we have the following recurrence relation:
OPT(i, j) = max
ℓ≥j
[ivj(F (vℓ)− F (vj)) +OPT (i+ 1, ℓ)] (2)
This yields a straightforward two-dimensional dynamic program. For i = k, we have OPT(i, j) =
kvj(1− F (vj)) for all j ≤ n. For j = n+ 1, we have OPT (i, j) = 0 for all i. The remaining values
of OPT (i, j) can be computed by filling a memoization table starting with high values of i and j
and moving to low values.
4.3 The Ubiquity of Price Discrimination
We now show that in a sense, the second-degree price discrimination observed above is unavoidable.
In particular, it will occur for every continuous, fully-supported value distribution. Formally:
Theorem 4.1. For every continuous, fully-supported value distribution F , and for every number
of items i between 0 and k, there is a positive measure of values who will purchase exactly i items
under the revenue-optimal mechanism to sell to a simple value maximizer with value distribution F .
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.1 Theorem 3.1 implies that every deterministic truthful mechanism is
characterized completely by its choice of thresholds tj at which the allocation level increases from
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j− 1 to j for all j from 1 to k. Moreover, we have that the revenue of such a mechanism is given by
k∑
ℓ=1
ℓ · tℓ(F (tℓ+1)− F (tℓ)). (3)
We consider a mechanism which does not sell i items with positive probability, and show how
to improve the mechanism’s revenue — hence, such a mechanism cannot be optimal. A similar
argument implies that no mechanism which sells with probability 1 is optimal.
A mechanism which for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} does not sell exactly i items with positive probability
must have ti = ti+1. Choose the lowest i for which this is the case. Then ti − ti−1 > 0. We will
show that such a mechanism’s revenue can be improved by slightly decreasing ti to t′i = ti − ǫ for
some sufficiently small ǫ > 0. This decreases the measure of values purchasing exactly i − 1 items
by F (ti)−F (ti− ǫ), which decreases the revenue contribution from this event by (i−1)ti−1(F (ti)−
F (ti− ǫ)). Meanwhile, decreasing ti causes a Fi(ti)−F (ti− ǫ) measure of values to purchase exactly
i items instead, yielding a revenue increase of i(ti− ǫ)(Fi(ti)−F (ti− ǫ)). The gain from decreasing
ti outweighs the loss as long as (i − 1)ti−1 < i(ti − ǫ), which holds as long as ǫ is sufficiently
small.
5 A Generalizable Definition of GSP
A significant byproduct of our existential theory from Section 3 is that we gain a new perspective
on the generalized second price (GSP) auction commonly used in Internet advertising.
When Google launched its pay-per-click AdWords auction in February 2002, it aimed to allevi-
ate stability issues in contemporary first price models by incorporating ideas from a second price
auction. Google quickly realized that its implementation did not generalize a second price auction
according to the standard theory—the proper generalization would be the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism—but the GSP auction they invented was performing well enough that the po-
tential gains of switching to VCG were not worth the risk and disruption [Varian and Harris, 2014].
(Overture.com, formerly GoTo.com and later bought by Yahoo, introduced the first sponsored search
auctions in 1998 and was still the dominant player in 2002. Their auction had pay-your-bid pricing
that has since been dubbed the generalized first price auction, or GFP.)
While GSP has thrived in the industry, the research community has struggled to rationalize
it. Initial analyses showed that revenue and welfare in reasonable equilibria are no worse than
VCG [Varian, 2007, Edelman et al., 2007]. Later studies offered more nuanced analyses — a more
recent justification falls out of GSP’s simplicity: GSP’s equilibrium guarantees are immune to certain
errors in click modeling [Milgrom, 2010, Dütting et al., 2016]. Unfortunately, none of these results
would guide us to invent GSP if it weren’t already implemented in practice.
Our work suggests a a simpler and more powerful rationalization for GSP that we will explore
in this section: GSP is truthful for value maximizers.
5.1 ROI, Value Maximizers, and GSP
We previously argued that advertisers’ objectives are well-modeled by value maximization subject
to a ROI constraint. We also hinted that this was equivalent to our simple value maximizer model,
which we now formalize:
Lemma 5.1. If a deterministic auction is truthful for simple value maximizers, it will be a dominant
strategy for a value maximizer with value vi and ROI constraint γ to report what it is willing to pay,
v′i = wi =
vi
1+γ .
11
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5.1. Both bidders have the same preferences over bundles that are preferred
to non-participation, so a dominant strategy for a simple value maximizer with value wi will also
be a dominant strategy for a value maximizer with value vi and ROI constraint γ.
Note that we no-longer expect bidders to report vi and instead expect they will report what
they are willing to pay, wi. If we desired a true direct revelation mechanism we could ask bidders
to report γ as well, but in practice it is more natural to report what one is willing to pay than what
something is truly worth.
With this lemma in hand, it remains to show that GSP is truthful for simple value maximizers.
Surprisingly, this is nearly trivial, and was observed by Aggarwal et al. [2009] in the context of a
general preference model. The proof via Aggarwal et al. [2009] observes that value maximizers with
ROI constraints can be mapped to their maximum price bidder model. We sketch a proof from first
principles for intuition, and generalize it to value maximizers with an ROI constraint. A rigorous
generalization of this proof can be found in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 5.2 (Application of Aggarwal et al. [2009]). GSP is truthful (effectively DSIC-AE, see
Definition 2.6) for value maximizers with ROI constraints, that is, it is a dominant strategy for a
bidder to report the maximum price she is willing to pay.
Proof. Sketch of the proof. Note that the GSP price pi is the minimum bid i could have submitted
while maintaining the same rank in the auction.
First, assume that bidders are simple value maximizers. Fix a bidder i and bids b−i. By the
taxation principle, we can think about bidder i choosing among the slots at prices pi,j. Let Vi,j ⊆ ℜ
denote the set of value reports for which i wins slot j under a particular auction.
For a pricing to be truthful for a value maximizer, it should be that i wins a particular slot j
if and only if (a) it is willing to pay pi,j for slot j and (b) is not willing to pay pi,j−1 for the slot
immediately above it. This implies that (a) pj ≤ inf Vi,j and (b) pj−1 ≥ supVi,j−1 and thus
supVi,j+1 ≤ pi,j ≤ inf Vi,j
that is, pi,j is the threshold value (bid) at which i moves from slot j + 1 to slot j. This is precisely
the GSP price. Finally, with the help of Lemma 5.1, we can extend above to value maximizers with
an ROI constraint.
5.2 Generalizing GSP
A significant consequence of this new view of GSP is that we discover a principled way to generalize
it. We first remark that GSP is often described by the following folklore definition (this definition
completely specifies GSP pricing in the standard position auction model):
Definition (Folklore). GSP is the auction that maximizes expected bidder value and charges the
minimum bid required to keep the same allocation.
Until now, this definition was merely a pleasant-sounding heuristic for general auction settings;
however, our work gives this definition theoretical teeth:
Observation 5.3. The folklore definition of GSP is equivalent to the truthful auction for value
maximizers defined in Theorem 3.1.
This inspires the following generalized definition of GSP:
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Definition (Proposed). A generalized second price auction (GSP) maximizes expected bidder value
and charges prices that make the auction truthful for simple value maximizers.
This definition is important because it allows us to extend GSP to new contexts in a principled
way. Doing so is especially important problem because ads are becoming progressively more com-
plex, and the algorithms required to optimize their placement and features are following suit. A small
existing literature has struggled to generalize GSP in the context of quasilinear bidders, generally
finding equilibria may not exist and that even when they do, they may not be efficient [Deng et al.,
2010, Cavallo and Wilkens, 2014, Bachrach et al., 2014]. Our characterization suggests that these
negative results may be because GSP’s strength was misunderstood.
6 Robustness Value Maximizing Model in Internet Advertising
We now show that our minimal theoretical model is robust in a practical sense. Value maximization
is intuitively an extreme behavior, so it would be unsurprising if small modeling changes dramatically
changed our results. However, we find that the opposite happens in the presence of ROI constraints:
a sufficient ROI constraint generally makes nearly any advertiser look like a value maximizer. An
example is instructive:
Example 6.1. Suppose that a bidder has an ROI constraint of 1 and has choices between an
outcome o with value vixi(o) = 1 and an outcome o′ with value vixi(o′) = 10. Assuming p ≥ 0, a
profit-maximizing bidder will prefer o′ to o at any price p′ ≤ $9; however, since bidder i has an ROI
constraint of 1, she will only consider outcome o′ when p′ ≤ $5. As a result, any time o′ is cheap
enough for her to consider it, she will always prefer it to outcome o — in this example, bidder i is
effectively a simple value maximizer with value v′i =
1
2vi.
More generally, when outcomes in an auction lead to dramatically different allocations, a bidder
must face a very high price before a lesser outcome (lower value) would become preferable. In such
cases, a mild ROI constraint—which caps the price an advertiser is willing to pay—will push a
bidder towards simple value maximizing behavior.
6.1 Theoretical Robustness
To formalize this, we define a broad class of preference relations that captures everything from
quasilinear to value-maximizing behaviors:
Definition 6.2. A preference relation ≺i is super-quasilinear if an agent who prefers a higher-
value option under quasi-linear preferences also always prefers this option under ≺i when both are
preferred to non-participation, i.e.,
vixi(o) ≥ vixi(o
′) and (vi − pi)xi(o) ≥ (vi − p
′
i)xi(o
′) ≥ 0 ⇒ (o, pi) i (o
′, p′i) .
and prefers non-participation to any option with pi > vi.
This class includes traditional quasilinear bidders and value maximizers, as well as families
of preferences that interpolate between them, such as profit-maximizing preferences with an ROI
constraint γ (when vi represents the maximum price that satisfies i’s ROI constraint).
For super-quasilinear bidders we derive a condition under which an ROI constraint makes all pref-
erences look value-maximizing. Our condition simply says that the xi’s generated by the mechanism
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are sufficiently different that the ROI constraint precludes any scenarios in which value-maximizing
and quasilinear preferences would result in a different best response for i.
Theorem 6.3. When bidders have super-quasi-linear preferences ≺i, an ROI constraint γ, and
vixi(o)
γ
γ + 1
≥ vixi(o
′) for all vi, o, o
′ where xi(o) > xi(o
′) ,
no bidder wishes to lie in an auction that is truthful, is individually rational for value maximizers,
and has no positive transfers (no positive transfers means that the auctioneer never pays the bidders;
individual rationality says that every bidder is at least as happy as if she had not participated at all.)
Proof. Proof of Theorem 6.3. Let o and pi be the outcome and price that the bidder sees if it reports
truthfully. Let o′ and p′i be any outcome and price that the bidder can achieve by lying.
First, suppose that xi(o′) < xi(o), i.e., bidder i is lying to achieve an outcome with a lower value.
Then we know from individual rationality that pi ≤
vi
γ+1 , and we know from no-positive-transfers
that p′i ≥ 0. Thus, by the conditions of the theorem, we know that
(vi − pi)xi(o) ≥ vi
γ
γ + 1
xi(o) > vixi(o
′) ≥ (vi − p
′
i)xi(o
′) .
In words, a profit-maximizing bidder prefers truthful reporting at the maximum individually-rational
price to lying, even if o′ happened for free. Since bidder i has super-profit-maximizing preferences
and vi(o) > vi(o′), it follows (o, pi) ≻i (o′, p′i).
Next, suppose that xi(o′) = xi(o). We know that the mechanism is truthful for value maximizers,
so it must be that pi ≤ p′i, otherwise a value maximizer would lie to achieve o
′, p′i. Since any
super-quasilinear bider will prefer a lower price for the same allocation, we can conclude that
(o, pi) i (o
′, p′i).
Finally, suppose that xi(o′) > xi(o). By individual rationality we know (o, pi) i (0, 0). Since the
auction is truthful for value maximizers, we know that p′i > vi, otherwise a value maximizer would
lie to achieve (o′, p′i). By definition of a super-quasilinear bidder, p
′
i > vi implies (0, 0) ≻i (o
′, p′i)
and so we get (o, pi) i (0, 0) ≻i (o′, p′i), implying bidder i will prefer to tell the truth.
6.2 Empirical Robustness
To empirically evaluate Theorem 6.3, we look at Yahoo marketplace data and ask for what ROI
constraint can we safely conclude that any super-quasilinear bidder would behave like a value maxi-
mizer?
We employ the standard separable click-through-rate (CTR) framework used to study sponsored
search auctions. In this model, n ads compete for m slots. Each ad i has a private value per click
vi, and there exist public parameters (α1, . . . , αm) and (β1, . . . , βn) such that, when ad i is shown
in slot j, the user clicks on it with probability:
Pr[click on ad i when shown in slot j] = αjβi,
Note that for any ad i and slot j, we have Pr[click on ad i when shown in slot j]
Pr[click on ad i when shown in slot j + 1] =
αj
αj+1
.
If we directly apply our theorem to this separable model we get the following conservative
corollary stating that when the probability of a click drops substantially from slot j to slot j + 1,
then a mild ROI constraint makes agents look like value maximizers:
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Corollary 6.4 (of Theorem 6.3). If αj
αj+1
≥ γ
γ+1 for all i in a standard sponsored search auction,
then no bidder with super-quasi-linear preferences and a ROI constraint of γ wishes to lie under
GSP pricing.
This claim gives conditions under which no bidder has an incentive to lie, independent of other
bidders’ bids; however, using the bids of other agents may give sharper conditions. Given bids,
we can ask a simpler question of whether any bidder could possibly prefer to lie under current
marketplace conditions:
Lemma 6.5. When no two bidders have the same score βt, and
∀i,
αi
αi − αi+1
−
αi+1
αi − αi+1
βi+2bi+2
βi+1bi+1
< γ ,
no bidder with super-quasi-linear preferences and a ROI constraint of γ wishes to lie under GSP
pricing (i.e. under truthful pricing for value maximizers) holding others’ bids fixed.
The proof (omitted) is similar to Theorem 6.3.
We tested this lemma empirically by looking at bid data for the slot auctions on Yahoo’s home-
page stream. We took a dataset consisting of over one hundred thousand auctions from a brief
period of time within a single day.
Our results are striking — if bidders require an ROI of 1, then 80% of auctions would be such
that no bidder can benefit by lying under GSP pricing. This strongly suggests that GSP may in
fact be the appropriate auction for this setting. See Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the proportion of auctions in which truthtelling is a best-response for every
advertiser, given the bids of all others, assuming all bidders have a ROI constraint of γ. At γ = 1,
80% of auctions are such that nobody should lie; as γ approaches 2, virtually all auctions satisfy
Lemma 6.5. This is derived from a dataset of auctions from Yahoo’s homepage stream, in which
slot advertisements are interspersed in a stream of rich content links.
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7 The Greedy Mechanism for General Domains
We now move beyond single-parameter preferences and introduce a family of truthful mechanisms
based on a greedy allocation algorithm. Analogous to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction, these
greedy mechanisms are powerful because they are truthful for value maximizers even under the
most general valuation models.
The Greedy Auction. We first present a simple “unweighted” greedy auction for value maxi-
mizers with nonnegative values, defined in Algorithm 1, that informally proceeds as follows:
1. Compute the outcome o∗ by the following algorithm:
(a) Find the outcomes that maximize the value of the highest-value bidder.
(b) Among the outcomes from (a), find the outcomes that maximize the value of the second-
highest-value bidder.
(c) Repeat until all bidders have been considered and call the outcome o∗; if more than one
outcome remains, pick one arbitrarily.
2. Payments are computed as the following “externality”: among the (other) bidders whose values
change when i is present in the auction, identify the bidder who gets the most value if i weren’t
present; charge this value to i (in domains with well-ordered discrete typespaces, we charge a
price equal to the next type above this critical value).
Example 7.1. Suppose there are three outcomes {o1, o2, o3} and four bidders with values v1 =
{3, 3, 1}, v2 = {0.5, 1, 1}, v3 = {2, 1, 0}, and v4 = {0.5, 0.5, 0.5}.
The greedy maximizing auction for value maximizers chooses outcome o1 as follows:
1. The value of the highest-value bidder is maximized by taking either outcome o1 or o2 since
v1(o1) = v1(o2) = 3.
2. Among outcomes o1 and o2, the value of the second-highest-value bidder is maximized by
taking o1 since v3(o1) = 2.
To compute prices, observe that the auction would still choose o1 if bidder 1, 2, or 4 were removed
from the auction, so these bidders pay p{1,2,4} = 0. For bidder 3, notice that the outcome would
be o2 if it were removed: neither bidder 1 nor bidder 4 care whether the outcome is o1 or o2, but
bidder 2 gets v2(o2) = 1 from o2 instead of v2(o1) = 0.5 from o1. The price bidder 3 pays is bidder
2’s value for o2, i.e. p3 = v2(o2) = 1.
Our first theorem for this setting is that the greedy mechanism is truthful, as long as ties
only happen in a zero-measure subset of values. A tie occurs only when two different (non-trivial)
outcomes have exactly the same value for two different bidders. This condition is typically true if
one chooses the Lebesgue measure or any probability density.
Theorem 7.2. When values are nonnegative, the greedy auction for (simple) value maximizers is
DSIC-AE as long as ties under truthful bidding happen with measure zero.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 7.2. Observe that the greedy mechanism proceeds in rounds. In each
round, the bidder who can attain the highest value becomes the “winner” (unless there is a tie) and
we discard outcomes that do not achieve this optimal value. Let Or denote the eligible outcomes
at round r, i∗r denote the bidder who wins round r and vr denote the value it receives.
Say that a value vector v results in a tie if there are distinct bidders i and j and outcomes oi
and oj such that vi(oi) = vj(oj) > 0. For now, assume that ties do not happen. Note the following:
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ALGORITHM 1: The Greedy Mechanism for Value Maximizers.
Algorithm Greedy({bi})
Input: Bids , one vector bi ∈ ℜm per bidder.
Output: An outcome o∗.
C ← O; // Candidate outcomes
for k = 1 to n do
C ← argmaxo∈C(k-th highest bid for outcome o);
end
return o∗ ∈ C; // Break ties according to any order on O
Mechanism GreedyMech({bI})
Input: Bids {bi}, one vector bi ∈ ℜm per bidder.
Output: An outcome o∗ and payments {pi}.
o∗ ← Greedy(b);
for i = 1 to n do
o∗−i ← Greedy(b−i,−∞);
pi ← max
{
bj(o
∗
−i)
∣∣bj(o∗−i) > bj(o∗)
}
;
end
return o∗, {pi};
(a) In the round where bidder i is the winner, she gets the outcome with the highest value to
her—which is also the outcome with the highest value—among all remaining outcomes.
(b) In order to win in an earlier round r, bidder i must express a value at least c = vr >
maxo∈Or vi(o) and will pay pi = c. (The inequality is strict because we assumed no ties.)
(a) implies that bidder i is getting her favorite outcome among the outcomes remaining when
she wins, so she cannot gain by changing the outcome in that round or a later round. (b) implies
that bidder i cannot gain by winning an earlier round, because she would need to pay a price greater
than her maximum value for any remaining outcome.
Our previous argument assumed no ties occur. When the bid space is continuous, ties happen
with measure zero and the mechanism is DSIC-AE.
Transformed Greedy Mechanisms. Next, we show how the greedy mechanism can be gener-
alized. Algorithm 2 defines the mechanism, which allows negative values, discretized bid spaces,
arbitrary monotone transformations of bidders’ values, and outcome-specific “offsets.” Informally,
the transformed greedy auction for value maximizers transforms agent i’s value according to a mono-
tone function θi : ℜ → ℜ and greedily chooses an outcome according to θ. Again, any mechanism
in this family is truthful for any transformation of value:
Theorem 7.3. The transformed greedy auction is truthful for any nondecreasing transformations
θi and offsets θ0(o) as long as ties under truthful bidding happen with measure zero or the bid space
is discretized with a minimum increment.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 7.3. We prove the theorem when values are nonnegative. The reasoning
for negative values is analogous.
Say that a value vector v results in a tie if there are distinct i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and outcomes oi
and oj such that θi(oi) = θj(oj) > 0. For now, assume that ties do not happen.
Note the following:
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ALGORITHM 2: The Transformed Greedy Family of Mechanisms.
Algorithm TransformedGreedy({bi})
Input: Bids, one vector bi ∈ ℜm per bidder.
Output: An outcome o∗.
for o ∈ O do
z(o)← Sort {θ1(v1(o)), . . . , θn(vn(o)), θ0(o)} by |θi(vi(o))| in descending order.
end
o∗ ← o with greatest z(o) according to a lexicographic order (breaking ties by order on
O)
return o∗;
Mechanism TransformedGreedyMech({bI})
Input: Bids {bi}, one vector bi ∈ ℜm per bidder.
Output: An outcome o∗ and payments {pi}.
o∗ ← TransformedGreedy(b);
for i = 1 to n do
pi ← inf
{
b′i(o
+)
∣∣ o+ = b−i, b′i and bj(o+) = bj(o∗)
}
end
return o∗, {pi};
(a) The mechanism is IR by construction, so a bidder will never wish to lie to achieve a smaller
value.
(b) By definition the mechanism charges the same price to all types that get the same value, so
there is no incentive to misreport to get the same outcome at a lower price.
(c) Let o∗ be the outcome chosen by the mechanism and z∗ = z(o). Let Or denote the set of
outcomes that have the same value as z∗ in positions 1, . . . r − 1, and suppose that bidder
i ranks r-th in the vector z∗. Then for all k < r, z∗k > maxo∈Ok θi(vi(o)) (strictly since we
assumed no ties).
(a) and (b) imply that if there is a reason to lie about one’s type, it is to achieve a strictly higher
value. In order to do this, a bidder i must move up in the ranking; however, this requires placing a
bid bi(o) for some outcome such that θi(bi(o)) ≥ z∗r−1 and will cause bidder i to pay pi ≥ θ
−1
i (z
∗
r−1).
By (c) this implies pi > maxo vi(o), i.e. bidder i would necessarily pay more than its value.
As in 7.2, ties happen with measure zero when the bid space is continuous and we find that the
mechanism is DSIC-AE.
Moreover, when values are discretized additional analysis reveals that the mechanism is DSIC.
Note that our argument above only gets into trouble when the inequality in (c) is in fact equality,
i.e. z∗r−1 = maxo∈Ok θi(vi(o)). In particular, this implies that there is an outcome o
′ 6= o∗ such
that z∗r−1 = θi(vi(o
′)). Suppose that i lies and reports v′i instead, inducing the outcome o
′. The
payment p′i will be (replacing inf with min because we are in a well-ordered space with a minimum
bid increment):
p′i = min
{
b′′i (o
+)
∣∣o+ = TransformedGreedy(b−i, b′′i ) and b′j(o+) = b′j(o′)
}
≥ vi(o
′) + δ
where δ represents the minimum bid increment and the inequality follows because i needed to
increase its bid to get o′. This implies p′i ≥ vi(o
′) + δ > vi(o
′) and therefore i does not benefit by
lying in this scenario either. Thus, the mechanism is DSIC when values are discrete.
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Bounding Total Value. Although the existence of truthful mechanisms is a positive result,
it may be unfortunate for a mechanism designer because a greedy optimization cannot generally
guarantee an approximation better than Θ(n) to the optimal total generated value, i.e., sum of
agents’ values under an outcome.
Theorem 7.4. No transformed greedy mechanism can guarantee more than than a 1
n
fraction of
the optimal total generated value in the worst case.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 7.4 Suppose there are at least two outcomes and n bidders. Pick any
non-trivial transformed greedy mechanism (i.e. a mechanism that realizes at least two outcomes for
some inputs) with transformations θi and offsets θ0.
We label bidders and choose z such that θ1(z) > θi(z − ǫ) for all i > 1. Let bidder 1 have value
v1 = (z, z − ǫ, 0, . . . ) and let other bidders have values vi = (0, z − ǫ, 0, . . . ). The value-optimal
outcome is outcome 2, with a total value of (z − ǫ)n; however, a greedy mechanism must choose
outcome 1 because θ1(z) > θi(z− ǫ) for all i, leading to a total value of 1. This implies a worst-case
total value approximation of z
n(z−ǫ) .
The non-transformed greedy mechanism will achieve a total generated value of at leastmaxi,o vi(o) ≥
1
n
maxo
∑
i vi(o) and therefore guarantee at least a
1
n
fraction of the optimal total value.
8 Conclusion
The standard philosophy in theory work is that no model will be perfect, but careful analysis of
a simple model can generate insights. In mechanism design, it is typically taken for granted that
a simple quasilinear utility is the natural starting point for modeling any selfish agent. However,
motivated by an abundance of anecdotes and experience with bidding behavior in industry, we
suggest that an alternative model in which agents maximize value with minimal price sensitivity
is also important. While our model behaves poorly in certain extremes, it is a simple model that
captures a fundamental type of behavior.
Our work addresses a handful of basic questions that are solved for quasilinear bidders in the
classic theory, but many more remain open, for example:
• Can we prove a Roberts’s theorem for value maximizers?
• How do bidders’ preferences aggregate across auctions?
• What are bidders’ preferences over lotteries?
• What happens in non-truthful mechanisms? Does revenue equivalence hold?
We expect that many of these questions will have answers that suggest interesting and important
twists on the standard theory. Follow up work may also find empirical reasons to refine the value
maximizer preference structure we presented and analyzed here.
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